Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership

McAdams, David

doi:10.1257/mic.3.4.107

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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics: Vol. 3 No. 4 (November 2011)

AEJ: Micro Volume. 3, Issue 4 | left

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Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership

Article Citation

McAdams, David. 2011. "Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(4): 107-42.

DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.4.107

Abstract

Suppose that players in a stochastic partnership have the option to quit and rematch anonymously. If stage-game payoffs are subject to a persistent initial shock, the (unique) social welfare-maximizing equilibrium induces a "dating" process in which all partners enjoy the full potential equilibrium gains from each match. By contrast, maximizing social welfare in non-stochastic repeated games with rematching requires that players burn money or otherwise fail to realize all potential equilibrium gains. Comparative statics on welfare and turnover are also provided, consistent with documented patterns of "survivorship bias" and "honeymoon." (JEL C72, C73, C78)

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Online Appendix (243.17 KB)

Authors

McAdams, David (Duke U)

JEL Classifications

C72: Noncooperative Games
C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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