This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics: Vol. 2 No. 2 (May 2010)
AEJ: Micro Volume. 2, Issue 2 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)
AEJ: Micro Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)
Explore:
AEJ: Micro Forthcoming Articles
Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets
Article Citation
Ostrovsky, Michael, and
Michael Schwarz. 2010. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
2(2): 34-63.
DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.2.34
DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.2.34
Abstract
This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets. A school may suppress some information about students in order to improve their average job placement. We consider a setting with many schools, students, and jobs, and show that if early contracting is impossible, the same, "balanced" amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. When early contracting is allowed and information arrives gradually, if schools disclose the balanced amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early. If they disclose more, some students and employers will prefer to sign contracts before all information is revealed. (JEL C78, D82, D83)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
Authors
Ostrovsky, Michael (Stanford U)
Schwarz, Michael (Yahoo! Labs, Berkeley, CA)
Schwarz, Michael (Yahoo! Labs, Berkeley, CA)
JEL Classifications
C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Comments
View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment
