Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers
Aoyagi, Masaki. 2010. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
This paper studies a monopoly pricing problem when the seller can
choose the timing of a trade with each buyer, and a buyer's valuation
of the seller's good is the weighted sum of his and other buyers'
private signals. We show that it is optimal for the seller to employ a
sequential scheme that trades with one buyer at a time and allows
each buyer to observe the outcomes of all preceding transactions.
We also identify conditions under which the seller optimally trades
with the buyers in the increasing order of the weights they place on
other buyers' signals. (JEL D42, D82, L12)
Article Full-Text Access
Aoyagi, Masaki (ISER, Osaka U)
D42: Market Structure and Pricing: Monopoly
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
L12: Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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