Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers

Aoyagi, Masaki

doi:10.1257/mic.2.1.150

This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.

Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics: Vol. 2 No. 1 (February 2010)

AEJ: Micro Volume. 2, Issue 1 | left

Previous Article Next Article right

Expand

Quick Tools:

Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export Citation
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)

Explore:

AEJ: Micro - All Issues

AEJ: Micro Forthcoming Articles

Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers

Article Citation

Aoyagi, Masaki. 2010. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1): 150-82.

DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.1.150

Abstract

This paper studies a monopoly pricing problem when the seller can choose the timing of a trade with each buyer, and a buyer's valuation of the seller's good is the weighted sum of his and other buyers' private signals. We show that it is optimal for the seller to employ a sequential scheme that trades with one buyer at a time and allows each buyer to observe the outcomes of all preceding transactions. We also identify conditions under which the seller optimally trades with the buyers in the increasing order of the weights they place on other buyers' signals. (JEL D42, D82, L12)

Article Full-Text Access

Full-text Article

Additional Materials

Online Appendix (108.42 KB)

Authors

Aoyagi, Masaki (ISER, Osaka U)

JEL Classifications

D42: Market Structure and Pricing: Monopoly
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
L12: Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

Comments

View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment