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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics: Vol. 1 No. 2 (August 2009)
AEJ: Micro Volume. 1, Issue 2 | 
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AEJ: Micro Forthcoming Articles
Incentive Reversal
Article Citation
Winter, Eyal. 2009. "Incentive Reversal."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
1(2): 133-47.
DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.2.133
DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.2.133
Abstract
By incentive reversal we refer to situations in which an increase in
rewards for all agents results in fewer agents exerting effort. We
show that externalities among peers may give rise to such intriguing
situations even when all agents are fully rational. We provide a necessary
and sufficient condition for the organizational technology so
that it will be susceptible to incentive reversal. The condition implies
that some degree of complementarity is enough to allow incentive
reversal. (JEL D23, D82, M54)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Winter, Eyal (Hebrew U Jerusalem)
JEL Classifications
D23: Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
M54: Personnel Economics: Labor Management
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
M54: Personnel Economics: Labor Management
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