This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics: Vol. 1 No. 1 (February 2009)
AEJ: Micro Volume. 1, Issue 1 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)
AEJ: Micro Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Download Data Set (33.24 KB) | Link to Appendix (39.38 KB)
View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)
Explore:
AEJ: Micro Forthcoming Articles
The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory
Article Citation
Carrillo, Juan D., and
Thomas R. Palfrey. 2009. "The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
1(1): 151-81.
DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.1.151
DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.1.151
Abstract
We analyze a game of two-sided private information where players
have privately known "strengths" and can decide to fight or compromise.
If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a high
payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff. If both choose
to compromise, each player receives an intermediate payoff. The
only equilibrium is for players to always fight. In our experiment, we
observe frequent compromise, more fighting the lower the compromise
payoff and less fighting by first than second movers. We explore
several theories of cognitive limitations in an attempt to understand
these anomalous findings. (JEL C91, D82)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (33.24 KB) | Link to Appendix (39.38 KB)
Authors
Carrillo, Juan D. (U Southern CA, Los Angeles)
Palfrey, Thomas R. (CA Institute of Technology)
Palfrey, Thomas R. (CA Institute of Technology)
JEL Classifications
C91: Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
Comments
View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment
