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American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics: Vol. 4 No. 4 (October 2012)
AEJ: Macro Volume. 4, Issue 4 | 
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AEJ: Macro Forthcoming Articles
Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection
Article Citation
Ševčík, Pavel. 2012. "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection."
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
4(4): 163-97.
DOI: 10.1257/mac.4.4.163
DOI: 10.1257/mac.4.4.163
Abstract
This paper studies the joint dynamics of investor protection and economic
development in a political economy model with capital accumulation and occupational choice. Less investor protection implies higher costs of external financing for entrepreneurs. This excludes poorer agents from entrepreneurship, increasing the profits of the remaining entrepreneurs. The main determinants of investor protection policy preferences are the agent's net worth and the expected
return from entrepreneurship. When the policy is chosen by the simple majority rule, the model generates several implications consistent with the observed variation of investor protection over time and across countries. (JEL D72, E22, E32, G18, G38, J24, L26)
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Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (429.68 KB) | Online Appendix (272.80 KB)
Authors
Ševčík, Pavel (U Quebec, Montreal)
JEL Classifications
D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E22: Capital; Investment; Capacity
E32: Business Fluctuations; Cycles
G18: General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
G38: Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
J24: Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
L26: Entrepreneurship
E22: Capital; Investment; Capacity
E32: Business Fluctuations; Cycles
G18: General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
G38: Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
J24: Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
L26: Entrepreneurship
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