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American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics: Vol. 4 No. 2 (April 2012)
AEJ: Macro Volume. 4, Issue 2 |
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AEJ: Macro Forthcoming Articles
Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking
Article Citation
Acharya, Viral V.,
Denis Gromb, and
Tanju Yorulmazer. 2012. "Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking."
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
4(2): 184-217.
DOI: 10.1257/mac.4.2.184
DOI: 10.1257/mac.4.2.184
Abstract
We study interbank lending and asset sales markets in which banks with surplus liquidity have market power vis-à-vis banks needing liquidity, frictions arise in lending due to moral hazard, and assets are bank-specific. Surplus banks ration lending and instead purchase assets from needy banks, an inefficiency more acute during financial crises. A central bank acting as a lender-of-last-resort can ameliorate this inefficiency provided it is prepared to extend potentially loss-making loans or is better informed than outside markets, as might be the case if it also performs a supervisory role. This rationale for central banking finds support in historical episodes. (JEL E58, G01, G21, G28, L13, N21)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Online Appendix (139.68 KB)
Authors
Acharya, Viral V. (NYU)
Gromb, Denis (INSEAD, Fontainebleau)
Yorulmazer, Tanju (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
Gromb, Denis (INSEAD, Fontainebleau)
Yorulmazer, Tanju (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
JEL Classifications
E58: Central Banks and Their Policies
G01: Financial Crises
G21: Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
G28: Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
N21: Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
G01: Financial Crises
G21: Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
G28: Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
N21: Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
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