This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Journal of Economic Perspectives: Vol. 9 No. 2 (Spring 1995)
JEP Volume. 9, Issue 2 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners
Article Citation
Camerer, Colin F., and
Richard H. Thaler. 1995. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners."
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
9(2): 209-219.
DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.2.209
DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.2.209
Abstract
The recent research on ultimatum and dictator games is reviewed. New experiments reveal that the ultimatum game is quite robust to changes in stakes and the nationality of the players but dictator games are sensitive to many design features. Information in the ultimatum game is important. Responders will reject offers only if they are known to be proportionally stingy and are known to be chosen by the proposer (rather than picked at random). Much of the observed behavior can be successfully modeled using Matthew Rabin's (1993) notion of a fairness equilibrium, which incorporates manners into economics. In many market contexts, politeness pays.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
Authors
Camerer, Colin F. (CA Institute of Technology)
Thaler, Richard H. (Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell U)
Thaler, Richard H. (Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell U)
JEL Classifications
C70: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Comments
View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment
