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Journal of Economic Perspectives: Vol. 9 No. 1 (Winter 1995)
JEP Volume. 9, Issue 1 | 
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An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes
Article Citation
Levin, Jonathan, and
Barry Nalebuff. 1995. "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes."
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
9(1): 3-26.
DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.3
DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.3
Abstract
Many researchers, following Kenneth Arrow's lead, have concerned themselves with stating various desirable or undesirable criteria and attempting to classify vote-counting systems. This paper moves away from theoretical discussions: the authors illustrate and motivate a variety of alternatives to plurality rule. The authors demonstrate by example how these alternatives, such as min-max majority and single transferable vote, work and where they fail. In choosing between flawed alternatives, which methods are best suited for selecting a single winner versus ranking the candidates? Does one approach favor candidates with loyal minorities or candidates with broad appeal? How do the authors achieve a representative outcome?
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
Authors
Levin, Jonathan (Nuffield College, Oxford U)
Nalebuff, Barry (Yale U)
Nalebuff, Barry (Yale U)
JEL Classifications
D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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