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Journal of Economic Perspectives: Vol. 6 No. 4 (Fall 1992)
JEP Volume. 6, Issue 4 | 
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Rationality in Extensive-Form Games
Article Citation
Reny, Philip J. 1992. "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games."
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
6(4): 103-118.
DOI: 10.1257/jep.6.4.103
DOI: 10.1257/jep.6.4.103
Abstract
Let us adopt the classical point of view that a theory of games is a description of "rational" behavior. Consequently, equipped with a book entitled "Theory of Games," any individual in any strategic situation need only consult the book to make a "rational" decision. One of the questions to address in this context is indeed whether or not strategies other than those provided by backward induction can ever appear in such a book. In offering an answer, we shall also explore the logical limits within which any "Theory of Games" must operate.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
Authors
Reny, Philip J. (U Western Ontario)
JEL Classifications
C70: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
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