This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Journal of Economic Perspectives: Vol. 2 No. 3 (Summer 1988)
JEP Volume. 2, Issue 3 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
Anomalies: Cooperation
Article Citation
Dawes, Robyn M., and
Richard H. Thaler. 1988. "Anomalies: Cooperation."
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
2(3): 187-197.
DOI: 10.1257/jep.2.3.187
DOI: 10.1257/jep.2.3.187
Abstract
Much economic analysis -- and virtually all game theory -- starts with the assumption that people are both rational and selfish. The predictions derived from this assumption of rational selfishness are, however, violated in many familiar contexts. In this column and the next one, the evidence from laboratory experiments is examined to see what has been learned about when and why humans cooperate. This column considers the particularly important case of cooperation vs. free riding in the context of public good provision.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
Authors
Dawes, Robyn M. (Unlisted)
Thaler, Richard H. (Unlisted)
Thaler, Richard H. (Unlisted)
JEL Classifications
024: Welfare Theory--General
215: Experimental Economic Methods
215: Experimental Economic Methods
Comments
View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment
