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Journal of Economic Perspectives: Vol. 10 No. 4 (Fall 1996)
JEP Volume. 10, Issue 4 | 
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Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage
Article Citation
Lundberg, Shelly, and
Robert A. Pollak. 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage."
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
10(4): 139-158.
DOI: 10.1257/jep.10.4.139
DOI: 10.1257/jep.10.4.139
Abstract
The standard economic model of the family is a 'common preference' model that assumes that a family maximizes a single utility function and implies that family behavior is independent of which individuals receive income or control resources. In recent years, this model has been challenged by game-theoretic models of marriage that do not impose 'pooling' and are, therefore, consistent with empirical evidence that income controlled by husbands and wives does have different effects on family behavior. In this paper, the authors review a number of simple bargaining models and relevant empirical evidence, and discuss their implications for distribution within marriage.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
Authors
Lundberg, Shelly (U WA)
Pollak, Robert A. (Washington U, St Louis)
Pollak, Robert A. (Washington U, St Louis)
JEL Classifications
J12: Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
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