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Journal of Economic Literature: Vol. 39 No. 2 (June 2001)
JEL Volume. 39, Issue 2 | 
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JEL Indexes (Members Only)Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling
Article Citation
Riley, John G. 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling."
Journal of Economic Literature,
39(2): 432-478.
DOI: 10.1257/jel.39.2.432
DOI: 10.1257/jel.39.2.432
Abstract
The theory of market signaling and screening is a cornerstone of the new economics of information. The last two and a half decades have not only witnessed a series of remarkable theoretical developments but also a wide range of applications. This essay examines the key theoretical issues and explores their use in three major fields: industrial organization, labor, and finance. Considerable emphasis is placed on attempts to test the theory in each of these fields.
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Authors
Riley, John G. (UCLA)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D44: Auctions
C70: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
D44: Auctions
C70: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
