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American Economic Journal: Applied Economics: Vol. 3 No. 3 (July 2011)
AEJ: Applied Volume. 3, Issue 3 |
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AEJ: Applied Forthcoming Articles
Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry
Article Citation
Jackson, C. Kirabo, and
Henry S. Schneider. 2011. "Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry."
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
3(3): 244-67.
DOI: 10.1257/app.3.3.244
DOI: 10.1257/app.3.3.244
Abstract
This study investigates the role of social networks in aligning the incentives of agents in settings with incomplete contracts. Specifically, the study examines the New York City taxi industry where taxis are often leased and lessee-drivers have worse driving outcomes than owner-drivers due to moral hazard. Using within-driver variation and instrumental variable strategies to remove selection, we find that drivers leasing from members of their country-of-birth community exhibit significantly reduced effects of moral hazard, representing an improvement of almost one-half of a standard deviation of the outcome measures. Screening is ruled out as an explanation, and other mechanisms are investigated. (JEL D82, D86, L92, Z13)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (50.54 MB) | Online Appendix (160.09 KB)
Authors
Jackson, C. Kirabo (Northwestern U)
Schneider, Henry S. (Cornell U)
Schneider, Henry S. (Cornell U)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
L92: Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
Z13: Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
L92: Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
Z13: Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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