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American Economic Journal: Applied Economics: Vol. 2 No. 3 (July 2010)
AEJ: Applied Volume. 2, Issue 3 |
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AEJ: Applied Forthcoming Articles
Microfinance Games
Article Citation
Giné, Xavier,
Pamela Jakiela,
Dean Karlan, and
Jonathan Morduch. 2010. "Microfinance Games."
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
2(3): 60-95.
DOI: 10.1257/app.2.3.60
DOI: 10.1257/app.2.3.60
Abstract
Microfinance banks use group-based lending contracts to strengthen borrowers' incentives for diligence, but the contracts are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion. We systematically unpack microfinance
mechanisms through ten experimental games played in an experimental
economics laboratory in urban Peru. Risk-taking broadly conforms to theoretical predictions, with dynamic incentives strongly reducing risk-taking even without group-based mechanisms. Group lending increases risk-taking, especially for risk-averse borrowers, but this is moderated when borrowers form their own groups. Group
contracts benefit borrowers by creating implicit insurance against investment losses, but the costs are borne by other borrowers, especially the most risk averse. (JEL D82, G21, G31, O16)
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Authors
Giné, Xavier (World Bank)
Jakiela, Pamela (Washington U in St Louis)
Karlan, Dean (Yale U)
Morduch, Jonathan (NYU)
Jakiela, Pamela (Washington U in St Louis)
Karlan, Dean (Yale U)
Morduch, Jonathan (NYU)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
G21: Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
G31: Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
O16: Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
G21: Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
G31: Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
O16: Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
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