This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics: Vol. 1 No. 1 (January 2009)
AEJ: Applied Volume. 1, Issue 1 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)
AEJ: Applied Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Download Data Set (78.17 KB)
View Comments on This Article (2) | Login to post a comment
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)
Explore:
AEJ: Applied Forthcoming Articles
Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India
Article Citation
Cole, Shawn. 2009. "Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India."
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
1(1): 219-50.
DOI: 10.1257/app.1.1.219
DOI: 10.1257/app.1.1.219
Abstract
This paper integrates theories of political budget cycles with theories
of tactical electoral redistribution to test for political capture in a
novel way. Studying banks in India, I find that government-owned
bank lending tracks the electoral cycle, with agricultural credit
increasing by 5-10 percentage points in an election year. There is
significant cross-sectional targeting, with large increases in districts
in which the election is particularly close. This targeting does not
occur in nonelection years or in private bank lending. I show capture
is costly: elections affect loan repayment, and election-year credit
booms do not measurably affect agricultural output. (JEL D72, O13,
O17, Q14, Q18)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (78.17 KB)
Authors
Cole, Shawn (Harvard U)
JEL Classifications
D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O13: Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
O17: Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Q14: Agricultural Finance
Q18: Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
O13: Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
O17: Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Q14: Agricultural Finance
Q18: Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
Comments
View Comments on This Article (2) | Login to post a comment
Posted By: Atindra Sen (Miami University)
Date: 2009-01-27 11:19:32
I wonder if the data includes cooperative banks and if they do, whether they have been classified as public or private.