Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
Parag A. Pathak, and
Alvin E. Roth. 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match."
American Economic Review,
The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs
among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical
questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in school preferences.
Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences
the same way at every school -- single tiebreaking -- in a student-proposing
deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized
tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally,
we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with
strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.
(JEL C78, D82, I21)
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Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila (Duke U)
Pathak, Parag A. (MIT)
Roth, Alvin E. (Harvard U)
C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
I21: Analysis of Education