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American Economic Review: Vol. 99 No. 4 (September 2009)
AER Volume. 99, Issue 4 | 
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Field Centipedes
Article Citation
Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, and
Oscar Volij. 2009. "Field Centipedes."
American Economic Review,
99(4): 1619-35.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1619
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1619
Abstract
In the centipede game, all standard equilibrium concepts dictate that the player who decides first must stop the game immediately. There is vast experimental evidence, however, that this rarely occurs. We first conduct a field experiment in which highly ranked chess players play this game. Contrary to previous evidence, our results show that69 percent of chess players stop immediately. When we restrict attention to Grandmasters, this percentage escalates to 100 percent. We then conduct a laboratory experiment in which chess players and students are matched in different treatments. When students play against chess players, the outcome approaches the subgame-perfect equilibrium. (JEL C72, C93)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (22.21 KB) | Download Additional Materials (88.35 KB)
Authors
Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio (London School of Economics)
Volij, Oscar (Ben-Gurion U Negev)
Volij, Oscar (Ben-Gurion U Negev)
JEL Classifications
C72: Noncooperative Games
C93: Field Experiments
C93: Field Experiments
