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American Economic Review: Vol. 99 No. 4 (September 2009)
AER Volume. 99, Issue 4 |
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The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
Article Citation
Besley, Timothy, and
Torsten Persson. 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics."
American Economic Review,
99(4): 1218-44.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1218
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1218
Abstract
Economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity
to support markets and levy taxes. This paper develops a framework where
"policy choices" in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past
investments in legal and fiscal capacity. It studies the economic and political
determinants of such investments, demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity
are typically complements. The results show that, among other things, common
interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability
and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity.
Some correlations in cross-country data are consistent with the theory. (JEL
D72, E62, H11, H20, P14)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
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Download Data Set (25.47 KB)
Authors
Besley, Timothy (London School of Economics and CIFAR)
Persson, Torsten (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm U and CIFAR)
Persson, Torsten (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm U and CIFAR)
JEL Classifications
D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E62: Fiscal Policy
H11: Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H20: Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
P14: Capitalist Systems: Property Rights
E62: Fiscal Policy
H11: Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H20: Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
P14: Capitalist Systems: Property Rights

