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American Economic Review: Vol. 99 No. 3 (June 2009)
AER Volume. 99, Issue 3 | 
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AER Forthcoming Articles
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
Article Citation
Kojima, Fuhito, and
Parag A. Pathak. 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets."
American Economic Review,
99(3): 608-27.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.3.608
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.3.608
Abstract
A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled
as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in
many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism
when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions,
we show that the fraction of participants with incentives to misrepresent their
preferences when others are truthful approaches zero as the market becomes
large. With an additional condition, truthful reporting by every participant is
an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in
large markets. (JEL C78)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Online Appendix (345.68 KB)
Authors
Kojima, Fuhito (Yale U)
Pathak, Parag A. (Harvard U and MIT)
Pathak, Parag A. (Harvard U and MIT)
JEL Classifications
C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
