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American Economic Review: Vol. 99 No. 1 (March 2009)
AER Volume. 99, Issue 1 |
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Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending
Article Citation
Adams, William,
Liran Einav, and
Jonathan Levin. 2009. "Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending."
American Economic Review,
99(1): 49-84.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.1.49
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.1.49
Abstract
We present new evidence on consumer liquidity constraints and the credit market
conditions that might give rise to them. We analyze unique data from a large
auto sales company serving the subprime market. Short-term liquidity appears
to be a key driver of consumer behavior. Demand increases sharply during tax
rebate season and purchases are highly sensitive to down-payment requirements.
Lenders also face substantial informational problems. Default rates rise
significantly with loan size, providing a rationale for loan caps, and higher-risk
borrowers demand larger loans. This adverse selection is mitigated, however,
by risk-based pricing. (JEL D14, D82, D83, G21)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (107.94 KB) | Appendix (85.59 KB)
Authors
Adams, William (Citigroup Inc, New York)
Einav, Liran (Stanford U)
Levin, Jonathan (Stanford U)
Einav, Liran (Stanford U)
Levin, Jonathan (Stanford U)
JEL Classifications
D14: Personal Finance
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
G21: Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
G21: Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

