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American Economic Review: Vol. 99 No. 1 (March 2009)
AER Volume. 99, Issue 1 | 
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Cognition and Incomplete Contracts
Article Citation
Tirole, Jean. 2009. "Cognition and Incomplete Contracts."
American Economic Review,
99(1): 265-94.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.1.265
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.1.265
Abstract
Thinking about contingencies, designing covenants, and seeing through their
implications is costly. Parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave
it incomplete. The paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its
consequences for contractual design. (JEL D23, D82, D86, L22)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Tirole, Jean (Toulouse School of Economics)
JEL Classifications
D23: Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
L22: Firm Organization and Market Structure
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
L22: Firm Organization and Market Structure
