Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile
Jean-Marie Baland and James A. Robinson
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| Article Citation |
Baland, Jean-Marie, and James A. Robinson. 2008. "Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile." American Economic Review, 98(5): 1737–65.
DOI:10.1257/aer.98.5.1737
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| Abstract |
Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the
political institutions, the presence of such rents allows employers to use the
threat of withdrawing them to control their workers' political behavior, such
as their votes in the absence of secret ballot. We examine the effects of the
introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the
reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tended to
exhibit a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally associated
with the landed oligarchy. After the reform, however, this difference across
localities completely disappeared. (JEL D72, N46, O13, O15, O17)
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| Article Full-Text Access |
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| Additional Materials |
Link to Data Set
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| Authors |
Baland, Jean-Marie (U Notre-Dame de la Paix)
Robinson, James A. (Harvard U)
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| JEL Classifications |
D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
N46: Economic History: Government, War, Law, and Regulation: Latin America; Caribbean
O13: Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
O15: Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
O17: Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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