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American Economic Review: Vol. 98 No. 4 (September 2008)
AER Volume. 98, Issue 4 | 
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All-or-Nothing Monitoring
Article Citation
Zhao, Rui R. 2008. "All-or-Nothing Monitoring."
American Economic Review,
98(4): 1619-28.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.4.1619
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.4.1619
Abstract
A principal can observe both the output and input of an agent who works at a job involving multiple tasks. We provide a simple theory that explains why it may be optimal for the principal to use only an output-based incentive contract, even though the principal can monitor the agent's actions perfectly in all but one task and knows exactly which action is optimal for each task. (JEL D82, D86, M54)
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Full-text Article
Authors
Zhao, Rui R. (U Albany, SUNY)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
M54: Personnel Economics: Labor Management
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
M54: Personnel Economics: Labor Management
