This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 98 No. 3 (June 2008)
AER Volume. 98, Issue 3 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory
Article Citation
Ellingsen, Tore, and
Magnus Johannesson. 2008. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory."
American Economic Review,
98(3): 990-1008.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.990
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.990
Abstract
Desire for social esteem is a source of prosocial behavior. We develop a
model in which actors' utility of esteem depends on the audience. In a
principal agent setting, we show that the model can account for
motivational crowding out. Control systems and pecuniary incentives erode
morale by signaling to the agent that the principal is not worth
impressing. The model also offers an explanation for why agents are
motivated by unconditionally high pay and by mission-oriented principals.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Ellingsen, Tore (Stockholm School of Economics)
Johannesson, Magnus (Stockholm School of Economics)
Johannesson, Magnus (Stockholm School of Economics)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
