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AER - June 2008

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American Economic Review

Vol. 98, No. 3, June 2008


Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory
Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson

Article Citation
Ellingsen, Tore, and Magnus Johannesson. 2008. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory." American Economic Review, 98(3): 990–1008.
DOI:10.1257/aer.98.3.990

Abstract
Desire for social esteem is a source of prosocial behavior. We develop a model in which actors' utility of esteem depends on the audience. In a principal agent setting, we show that the model can account for motivational crowding out. Control systems and pecuniary incentives erode morale by signaling to the agent that the principal is not worth impressing. The model also offers an explanation for why agents are motivated by unconditionally high pay and by mission-oriented principals.

Article Full-Text Access
Full-Text Article

Authors
Ellingsen, Tore (Stockholm School of Economics)
Johannesson, Magnus (Stockholm School of Economics)

JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information