Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2-Games
Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura
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| Article Citation |
Selten, Reinhard, and Thorsten Chmura. 2008. "Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2-Games." American Economic Review, 98(3): 938–66.
DOI:10.1257/aer.98.3.938
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| Abstract |
Five stationary concepts for completely mixed 2 x 2-games are experimentally
compared: Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling
equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium (Martin J. Osborne and Ariel
Rubinstein 1998), and impulse balance equilibrium. Experiments on 12
games, 6 constant sum games, and 6 nonconstant sum games were run with 12
independent subject groups for each constant sum game and 6 independent
subject groups for each nonconstant sum game. Each independent subject
group consisted of four players 1 and four players 2, interacting
anonymously over 200 periods with random matching. The comparison of the
five theories shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as
follows: impulse balance equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium,
action-sampling equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, Nash
equilibrium.
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| Article Full-Text Access |
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| Additional Materials |
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| Authors |
Selten, Reinhard (Laboratory of Experimental Economics, Bonn)
Chmura, Thorsten (Shanghai Jiao Tong U)
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| JEL Classifications |
C70: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
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