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American Economic Review: Vol. 98 No. 3 (June 2008)
AER Volume. 98, Issue 3 | 
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Information Aggregation in Polls
Article Citation
Morgan, John, and
Phillip C. Stocken. 2008. "Information Aggregation in Polls."
American Economic Review,
98(3): 864-96.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.864
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.864
Abstract
We study information transmission via polling. A policymaker polls
constituents, who differ in their information and ideology, to determine
policy. Full revelation is an equilibrium in a poll with a small sample,
but not with a large one. In large polls, full information aggregation can
arise in an equilibrium where constituents endogenously sort themselves
into centrists, who respond truthfully, and extremists, who do not. We
find polling statistics that ignore strategic behavior yield biased
estimators and mischaracterize the poll's margin of error. We construct
estimators that account for strategic behavior. Finally, we compare polls
and elections.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Link to Appendix (171.10 KB)
Authors
Morgan, John (U CA, Berkeley)
Stocken, Phillip C. (Dartmouth College)
Stocken, Phillip C. (Dartmouth College)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
C42: Survey Methods
C42: Survey Methods
