About the Association Membership Annual Meeting Committees Honors and Awards For Graduate Students For Undergraduate Students News and Notes

American Economic Review Journal of Economic Literature Journal of Economic Perspectives American Economic Journal: Applied Economics American Economic Journal: Economic Policy American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Institutional Subscriptions

EconLit Access EconLit for Members EconLit Desktop Link Contacts/Corrections Upcoming Exhibits Document Types Journal List Subject Descriptors Search Hints

RFE Search Complete Contents Abridged Contents Conferences Econ Search Engine

Recent Listings Submit a Listing About JOE Job Scramble

Member Login Become a Member Directory of Members Institutional Subscriptions

American Economic Review

Search:

AEA Member Login:

Quick Tools:

View Full Text of This Article

Full-Text Article

Email Link to this Article

Export Citation

Explore:

AER - Previous Issues

     Vol. 98, Issue: 1 - March 2008
     Vol. 97, Issue: 5 - December 2007
     Vol. 97, Issue: 4 - September 2007
     Vol. 97, Issue: 3 - June 2007
     Vol. 97, Issue: 2 - May 2007
     Vol. 97, Issue: 1 - March 2007
     Other Issues

AER - March 2008

Articles in this Issue
(or browse Issue in new window)

Evolution and Intelligent Design Free Article

(pp. 5 - 37)

Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show (pp. 38 - 71)

Rational Expectations in Games (pp. 72 - 86)

Asymmetric Auctions with Resale (pp. 87 - 112)

Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack (pp. 113 - 44)

When Does Coordination Require Centralization? (pp. 145 - 79)

On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Equilibrium (pp. 180 - 200)

A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt (pp. 201 - 36)

Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured US Electricity Markets (pp. 237 - 66)

Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions (pp. 267 - 93)

Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States (pp. 294 - 310)

Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers (pp. 311 - 32)

The Mystery of Monogamy (pp. 333 - 57)

An Equilibrium Model of "Global Imbalances" and Low Interest Rates (pp. 358 - 93)

Reallocation, Firm Turnover, and Efficiency: Selection on Productivity or Profitability? (pp. 394 - 425)

On the Evolution of Firm Size Distributions (pp. 426 - 38)

Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery (pp. 439 - 57)

Gambling at Lucky Stores: Empirical Evidence from State Lottery Sales (pp. 458 - 73)

A Model of Housing in the Presence of Adjustment Costs: A Structural Interpretation of Habit Persistence (pp. 474 - 95)

A Simple Auction Mechanism for the Optimal Allocation of the Commons (pp. 496 - 518)

The Dynamic Behavior of the Real Exchange Rate in Sticky Price Models (pp. 519 - 33)

Collective Memory, Cultural Transmission, and Investments (pp. 534 - 60)

Bureaucrats or Politicians? Comment (pp. 561 - 62)

JEL Indexes (Members Only)

American Economic Review

Vol. 98, No. 1, March 2008

Bureaucrats or Politicians? Comment Fuhito Kojima
Article Citation
Kojima, Fuhito 2008. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Comment." American Economic Review, 98(1): 561–62.
DOI:10.1257/aer.98.1.561
Abstract
Alesina and Tabellini (2007) investigate the normative criteria for allocating policy tasks to bureaucrats versus politicians. While they establish criteria with respect to a number of parameters, they do not give a criterion with respect to the degree of imperfect monitoring. We establish an unambiguous criterion about imperfect monitoring. (JEL D72, D73)

Article Full-Text Access

Full-Text Article

Authors

Kojima, Fuhito (Harvard U)

JEL Classifications

D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D73: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption