This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 98 No. 1 (March 2008)
AER Volume. 98, Issue 1 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
Article Citation
Acemoglu, Daron, and
James A. Robinson. 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions."
American Economic Review,
98(1): 267-93.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.267
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.267
Abstract
We construct a model to study the implications of changes in political institutions
for economic institutions. A change in political institutions alters the
distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in
de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power.
The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic
regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite. The
model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be
invariant to changes in political institutions, and economic institutions themselves
will persist over time. (JEL D02, D72)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Acemoglu, Daron (MIT)
Robinson, James A. (Harvard U)
Robinson, James A. (Harvard U)
JEL Classifications
D02: Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
