Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson
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| Article Citation |
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions." American Economic Review, 98(1): 267–93.
DOI:10.1257/aer.98.1.267
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| Abstract |
We construct a model to study the implications of changes in political institutions
for economic institutions. A change in political institutions alters the
distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in
de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power.
The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic
regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite. The
model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be
invariant to changes in political institutions, and economic institutions themselves
will persist over time. (JEL D02, D72)
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| Article Full-Text Access |
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| Authors |
Acemoglu, Daron (MIT)
Robinson, James A. (Harvard U)
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| JEL Classifications |
D02: Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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(pp. 5 - 37)