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American Economic Review: Vol. 98 No. 1 (March 2008)
AER Volume. 98, Issue 1 |
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Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack
Article Citation
Friedman, John N., and
Richard T. Holden. 2008. "Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack."
American Economic Review,
98(1): 113-44.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.113
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.113
Abstract
Standard intuitions for optimal gerrymandering involve concentrating one's
extreme opponents in "unwinnable" districts ("packing") and spreading one's
supporters evenly over "winnable" districts ("cracking"). These intuitions
come from models with either no uncertainty about voter preferences or only
two voter types. In contrast, we characterize the solution to a problem in which
a gerrymanderer observes a noisy signal of voter preferences from a continuous
distribution and creates N districts of equal size to maximize the expected
number of districts she wins. Under mild regularity conditions, we show that
cracking is never optimal—one's most ardent supporters should be grouped
together. Moreover, for sufficiently precise signals, the optimal solution
involves creating a district that matches extreme "Republicans" with extreme
"Democrats," and then continuing to match toward the center of the signal
distribution. (JEL D72)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Friedman, John N. (U CA, Berkeley)
Holden, Richard T. (MIT)
Holden, Richard T. (MIT)
JEL Classifications
D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

