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American Economic Review: Vol. 97 No. 5 (December 2007)
AER Volume. 97, Issue 5 | 
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Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts
Article Citation
Niederle, Muriel. 2007. "Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts."
American Economic Review,
97(5): 1957-1969.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1957
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1957
Abstract
Following the recently dismissed antitrust lawsuit against the National Residency
Matching Program (NRMP), Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin (2006) propose a simple
matching model in which firms set impersonal salaries simultaneously before matching
with workers, which leads to lower aggregate wages than any competitive outcome. I
model a feature of the NRMP, ordered contracts, that allows firms to set several contracts
while determining the order in which they try to fill them, which has different properties
than standard models with multiple contracts. Furthermore, the low wages of Bulow and
Levin are no longer an equilibrium, but competitive wages are. (JEL D86, J31, J41)
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Authors
Niederle, Muriel
