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American Economic Review: Vol. 97 No. 5 (December 2007)
AER Volume. 97, Issue 5 | 
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Individual Preferences for Giving
Article Citation
Fisman, Raymond,
Shachar Kariv, and
Daniel Markovits. 2007. "Individual Preferences for Giving."
American Economic Review,
97(5): 1858-1876.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1858
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1858
Abstract
We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual-
level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible
payoff-
pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we
recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and
the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive
elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving
from social preferences (trade-offs between the payoffs of others). And an intensive
elaboration employs step-shaped sets to distinguish between behaviors that
are compatible with well-behaved preferences and those compatible only with not
well-behaved cases. (JEL C72, D64)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (715.07 KB) | Link to Appendix (900.34 KB)
Authors
Fisman, Raymond
Kariv, Shachar
Markovits, Daniel
Kariv, Shachar
Markovits, Daniel
