This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 97 No. 4 (September 2007)
AER Volume. 97, Issue 4 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Download Data Set (9.49 KB) | Link to Additional Materials (161.19 KB)
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment
Article Citation
Filiz-Ozbay, Emel, and
Erkut Y. Ozbay. 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment."
American Economic Review,
97(4): 1407-1418.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.4.1407
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.4.1407
Abstract
This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first-price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret (felt when bidders lose at an affordable price). Different information structures are created to elicit regret: bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose (loser regret condition); or the second-highest bid if they win (winner regret condition); or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids. Bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid. However, bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret. (JEL D44)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (9.49 KB) | Link to Additional Materials (161.19 KB)
Authors
Filiz-Ozbay, Emel
Ozbay, Erkut Y.
Ozbay, Erkut Y.
