This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 97 No. 4 (September 2007)
AER Volume. 97, Issue 4 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements
Article Citation
Maggi, Giovanni, and
Andrés Rodríguez-Clare. 2007. "A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements."
American Economic Review,
97(4): 1374-1406.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.4.1374
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.4.1374
Abstract
We present a model where trade agreements are motivated by the desire of governments to commit vis-à-vis domestic lobbies, in addition to standard terms-of-trade
externalities. The model predicts that trade liberalization is deeper when capital is more mobile across sectors, and when governments are more politically motivated (provided domestic-commitment motives are strong enough). The model also provides a new rationale for the use of tariff ceilings. In a fully dynamic specification of the model, tariffs are reduced in two stages: an immediate cut and a subsequent gradual reduction, with the speed of liberalization increasing in the degree of capital
mobility. (JEL D72, F13)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Maggi, Giovanni
Rodríguez-Clare, Andrés
Rodríguez-Clare, Andrés
