This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 97 No. 1 (March 2007)
AER Volume. 97, Issue 1 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Link to Appendix (98.18 KB)
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
Conditional Cash Transfers, Public Provision of Private Goods, and Income Redistribution
Article Citation
Gahvari, Firouz, and
Enlinson Mattos. 2007. "Conditional Cash Transfers, Public Provision of Private Goods, and Income Redistribution."
American Economic Review,
97(1): 491-502.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.491
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.491
Abstract
This paper examines the role of cash transfers as a screening device when combined with in-kind transfers. It shows that linking in-kind to cash transfers makes first-best redistribution possible despite the government's inability to tell rich and poor individuals apart. Moreover, the maximal attainable welfare for the poor can be pushed beyond its first-best level by distorting downward the quality of the indivisible good the poor receive relative to the cash value of their net transfers. Using in-kind transfers alone, as in Besley and Coate (1991), leads to a third-best solution. (JEL D31, H23, H41)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Link to Appendix (98.18 KB)
Authors
Gahvari, Firouz
Mattos, Enlinson
Mattos, Enlinson
