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American Economic Review: Vol. 97 No. 1 (March 2007)
AER Volume. 97, Issue 1 | 
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Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules
Article Citation
Levy, Gilat. 2007. "Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules."
American Economic Review,
97(1): 150-168.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.150
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.150
Abstract
In this paper I analyze the effect of transparency on decision making in committees.
I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns. The main
result is that when the decision-making process is secretive (when individual votes
are not revealed to the public), committee members comply with preexisting biases.
For example, if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals
vote more often against reforms. Transparent committees are therefore more likely to
accept reforms. I also find that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure
may induce better decisions than a transparent one. (JEL D71, D72)
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Authors
Levy, Gilat
