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American Economic Review: Vol. 96 No. 4 (September 2006)
AER Volume. 96, Issue 4 | 
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Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations
Article Citation
Maggi, Giovanni, and
Massimo Morelli. 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations."
American Economic Review,
96(4): 1137-1158.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.4.1137
DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.4.1137
Abstract
Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, others by (simple
or qualified) majority rules. Standard voting models, which assume that the decisions
made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a hard time explaining the
observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence
of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from
standard voting models is that the organization cannot rely on external enforcement
mechanisms: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to comply with the
collective decision or, in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The
model identifies conditions under which the organization adopts the unanimity rule,
and yields rich comparative-statics predictions on the determinants of the mode of
governance. (JEL D72, F53)
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Authors
Maggi, Giovanni
Morelli, Massimo
Morelli, Massimo
