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American Economic Review: Vol. 91 No. 3 (June 2001)
AER Volume. 91, Issue 3 | 
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Costly Predation and the Distribution of Competence
Article Citation
Conlisk, John. 2001. "Costly Predation and the Distribution of Competence."
American Economic Review,
91(3): 475-484.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.3.475
DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.3.475
Abstract
An evolutionary game model shows how an equilibrium distribution of competence may evolve when members of a population prey on one another, but when predatory competence is costly to acquire. Under one interpretation, the competence distribution is an endogenously determined distribution of bounded rationality. An example shows how "tricksters" and "suckers" might coexist in the long run. The analysis leads to a curious result about a mixed equilibrium for a symmetric, zero-sum game. An increase in the costs of one or more competence levels has exactly zero effect on the fraction of the population at those levels.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Conlisk, John (U CA, San Diego)
JEL Classifications
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
C72: Noncooperative Games
C72: Noncooperative Games
