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American Economic Review: Vol. 90 No. 4 (September 2000)
AER Volume. 90, Issue 4 | 
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Meetings with Costly Participation
Article Citation
Osborne, Martin J.,
Jeffrey S. Rosenthal, and
Matthew A. Turner. 2000. "Meetings with Costly Participation."
American Economic Review,
90(4): 927-943.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.4.927
DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.4.927
Abstract
We study a collective decision-making process in which people interested in an issue may participate, at a cost, in a meeting, and the resulting decision is a compromise among the participants' preferences. We show that the equilibrium number of participants is small and their positions are extreme, and when the compromise is the median, the outcome is likely to be random. The model and its equilibria are consistent with evidence on the procedures and outcomes of U.S. regulatory hearings.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Osborne, Martin J. (U Toronto)
Rosenthal, Jeffrey S. (U Toronto)
Turner, Matthew A. (U Toronto)
Rosenthal, Jeffrey S. (U Toronto)
Turner, Matthew A. (U Toronto)
JEL Classifications
D71: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
