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American Economic Review: Vol. 90 No. 3 (June 2000)
AER Volume. 90, Issue 3 | 
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Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions
Article Citation
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, and
Jeroen M. Swinkels. 2000. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions."
American Economic Review,
90(3): 499-525.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.3.499
DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.3.499
Abstract
The tension between allocative efficiency and information aggregation is explored in the context of an auction: k identical objects of unknown quality are auctioned off to n bidders whose tastes affect their valuation of an object of given quality. Bidders receive a signal about the quality of the objects. The k highest bidders get an object and pay a price equal to the k + first highest bid. We find conditions under which, in the limit, objects are allocated efficiently to those with the highest tastes, and price converges in probability to the value of an object to the marginal taste type.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang (Princeton U)
Swinkels, Jeroen M. (Washington U)
Swinkels, Jeroen M. (Washington U)
JEL Classifications
D44: Auctions
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
