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American Economic Review: Vol. 89 No. 5 (December 1999)
AER Volume. 89, Issue 5 | 
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Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation
Article Citation
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, and
Giovanni Maggi. 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation."
American Economic Review,
89(5): 1135-1155.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.5.1135
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.5.1135
Abstract
The Grossman-Helpman "Protection for Sale" model, concerning the political economy of trade protection, yields clear predictions for the cross-sectional structure of import barriers. Our objective is to check whether the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model are consistent with the data and, if the model finds support, to estimate its key structural parameters. We find that the pattern of protection in the United States in 1983 is broadly consistent with the predictions of the model. A surprising finding is that the weight of welfare in the government's objective function is many times larger than the weight of contributions.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou (Columbia U)
Maggi, Giovanni (Princeton U)
Maggi, Giovanni (Princeton U)
JEL Classifications
F13: Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
