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American Economic Review: Vol. 89 No. 4 (September 1999)
AER Volume. 89, Issue 4 | 
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Gaming against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers
Article Citation
Cooper, David J. 1999. "Gaming against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers."
American Economic Review,
89(4): 781-804.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.4.781
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.4.781
Abstract
We examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in China, comparing behavior between: (i) students and managers with field experience with this situation, (ii) standard versus increased monetary incentives, and (iii) sessions conducted "in context," making explicit reference to interactions between planners and managers, and those without any such references. The dynamics of play are similar across treatments with play only gradually, and incompletely, converging on a pooling equilibrium. A fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial levels of strategic play. Games played in context generated greater levels of strategic play for managers, with minimal impact on students.
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Authors
Cooper, David J. (Case Western Reserve U)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
P31: Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
P31: Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
