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American Economic Review: Vol. 89 No. 3 (June 1999)
AER Volume. 89, Issue 3 | 
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Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium
Article Citation
Salant, Stephen W., and
Greg Shaffer. 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium."
American Economic Review,
89(3): 585-604.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.3.585
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.3.585
Abstract
Oligopoly models where prior actions by firms affect subsequent marginal costs have been useful in illuminating policy debates in areas such as antitrust regulation, environmental protection, and international competition. The authors discuss properties of such models when a Cournot equilibrium occurs at the second stage. Aggregate production costs strictly decline with no change in gross revenue or gross consumer surplus if the prior actions strictly increase the variance of marginal costs without changing the marginal-cost sum. Therefore, unless the cost of inducing second-stage asymmetry more than offsets this reduction in production costs, the private and social optima are asymmetric.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Salant, Stephen W. (U MI)
Shaffer, Greg (U Rochester)
Shaffer, Greg (U Rochester)
JEL Classifications
L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43: Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D43: Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
