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American Economic Review: Vol. 89 No. 3 (June 1999)
AER Volume. 89, Issue 3 | 
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Competing for Endorsements
Article Citation
Grossman, Gene M., and
Elhanan Helpman. 1999. "Competing for Endorsements."
American Economic Review,
89(3): 501-524.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.3.501
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.3.501
Abstract
Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. The authors examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria.
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Full-text Article
Authors
Grossman, Gene M. (Princeton U)
Helpman, Elhanan (Harvard U, Tel Aviv U, and Canadian Institute for Advanced Research)
Helpman, Elhanan (Harvard U, Tel Aviv U, and Canadian Institute for Advanced Research)
JEL Classifications
D72: Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
