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American Economic Review: Vol. 103 No. 1 (February 2013)
AER Volume. 103, Issue 1 |
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AER Forthcoming Articles
Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices
Article Citation
Grennan, Matthew. 2013. "Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices."
American Economic Review,
103(1): 145-77.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.1.145
DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.1.145
Abstract
Many important issues in business-to-business markets involve price
discrimination and negotiated prices, situations where theoretical
predictions are ambiguous. This paper uses new panel data on buyer-supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze
bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market.
While many phenomena that restrict different prices to different
buyers are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs (e.g.,
mergers, group purchasing organizations, and transparency), I find
that: (i) more uniform pricing works against hospitals by softening
competition; and (ii) results depend ultimately on a previously
unexplored bargaining effect. (JEL C78, L13, L14, L64)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (100.99 KB) | Online Appendix (355.12 KB)
Authors
Grennan, Matthew (U Toronto)
JEL Classifications
C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L14: Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
L64: Other Machinery; Business Equipment; Armaments
L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L14: Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
L64: Other Machinery; Business Equipment; Armaments

