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American Economic Review: Vol. 102 No. 6 (October 2012)
AER Volume. 102, Issue 6 |
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Download Data Set (752.06 KB) | Online Appendix (83.56 KB)
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AER Forthcoming Articles
Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi
Article Citation
Giné, Xavier,
Jessica Goldberg, and
Dean Yang. 2012. "Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi."
American Economic Review,
102(6): 2923-54.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.6.2923
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.6.2923
Abstract
We implemented a randomized field experiment in Malawi examining borrower responses to being fingerprinted when applying for loans. This intervention improved the lender's ability to implement dynamic repayment incentives, allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. As predicted by a simple model, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. We provide unique evidence that this improvement in repayment rates is accompanied by behaviors consistent with less adverse selection and lower moral hazard. (JEL D14, D82, G21, O12, O16)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (752.06 KB) | Online Appendix (83.56 KB)
Authors
Giné, Xavier (World Bank and BREAD, Washington, DC)
Goldberg, Jessica (U MD)
Yang, Dean (U MI and BREAD, Ann Arbor, MI)
Goldberg, Jessica (U MD)
Yang, Dean (U MI and BREAD, Ann Arbor, MI)
JEL Classifications
D14: Personal Finance
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
G21: Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
O12: Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O16: Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
G21: Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
O12: Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O16: Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

