This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 102 No. 3 (May 2012)
AER Volume. 102, Issue 3 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
Robustly Ranking Mechanisms
Article Citation
Börgers, Tilman, and
Doug Smith. 2012. "Robustly Ranking Mechanisms."
American Economic Review,
102(3): 325-29.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.3.325
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.3.325
Abstract
For a mechanism designer with an objective such as welfare we propose a method for robustly ranking mechanisms. The method is based on eliminating weakly dominated strategies only, and thus does not require any assumptions about agents' beliefs about each other except full support. We illustrate the usefulness of this method in two examples: bilateral trading and voting. In both examples we show that there are mechanisms that are ranked by our method above dominant strategy mechanisms. These examples question the literature's focus on dominant strategy mechanisms in cases when such mechanisms yield undesirable outcomes.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Börgers, Tilman (U MI)
Smith, Doug (US Federal Trade Commission)
Smith, Doug (US Federal Trade Commission)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
