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American Economic Review: Vol. 102 No. 1 (February 2012)
AER Volume. 102, Issue 1 | 
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Contracts versus Salaries in Matching
Article Citation
Echenique, Federico. 2012. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching."
American Economic Review,
102(1): 594-601.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.1.594
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.1.594
Abstract
Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. (JEL C78, D86, J31, J41)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Echenique, Federico (CA Institute of Technology)
JEL Classifications
C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
J31: Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J41: Labor Contracts
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
J31: Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J41: Labor Contracts
