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American Economic Review: Vol. 101 No. 2 (April 2011)
AER Volume. 101, Issue 2 | 
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The Bidder's Curse
Article Citation
Malmendier, Ulrike, and
Young Han Lee. 2011. "The Bidder's Curse."
American Economic Review,
101(2): 749-87.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.749
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.749
Abstract
We employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in auctions. We compare online auction prices to fixed prices for the same item on the same webpage. In detailed data on auctions of a board game, 42 percent of auctions exceed the simultaneous fixed price. The result
replicates in a broad cross-section of auctions (48 percent overbidding). A small fraction of overbidders, 17 percent of bidders, suffices to generate the large fraction of auctions with overbidding. We show that the observed behavior is inconsistent with rational behavior, even allowing for uncertainty about prices and switching costs, since the expected auction price also exceeds the fixed price. Limited
attention best explains our results. (JEL D12, D44)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (24.19 MB) | Online Appendix (126.50 KB)
Authors
Malmendier, Ulrike (U CA, Berkeley)
Lee, Young Han (Virtu Financial LLC, New York, NY)
Lee, Young Han (Virtu Financial LLC, New York, NY)
JEL Classifications
D12: Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D44: Auctions
D44: Auctions
