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American Economic Review: Vol. 101 No. 2 (April 2011)
AER Volume. 101, Issue 2 |
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AER Forthcoming Articles
Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
Article Citation
Dohmen, Thomas, and
Armin Falk. 2011. "Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender."
American Economic Review,
101(2): 556-90.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.556
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.556
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection
in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects face the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is a piece rate, a tournament, or a revenue-sharing scheme. We find that output is higher in the variable-payment schemes compared to the fixed-payment scheme.
This difference is largely driven by productivity sorting. In addition,
different incentive schemes systematically attract individuals with
different attitudes, such as willingness to take risks and relative self-assessment as well as gender, which underlines the importance of multidimensional sorting. (JEL C91, D81, D82, J16, J31)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (601.67 KB) | Online Appendix (235.76 KB)
Authors
Dohmen, Thomas (Maastricht U)
Falk, Armin (U Bonn)
Falk, Armin (U Bonn)
JEL Classifications
C91: Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D81: Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
J16: Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
J31: Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
D81: Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
J16: Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
J31: Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

